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With respect to political representation, it often seems that the U.S. stands in
relation to other democracies around the world today in the position that England stood
relative to the colonial U.S. During the colonial era, Americans debated ideas about
representation with great energy and attempted political reforms with a constant eye
toward bringing practice into line with theory. Colonial reformers extended the
franchise, demanded more frequent elections, increased the size of representative
assemblies, adopted secret ballots, and required periodic reapportionment.1 In Britain
during the same period, Members of Parliament were elected with restricted franchises,
no electoral districts had been added or subtracted for 100 years, and the crown and
private individuals owned “pocket boroughs.”2 The English attitude toward change can
be summed up by Lord Braxfield who in 1793 sentenced Thomas Muir, an advocate of
parliamentary reform, to fourteen years’ exile in Australia: “The British constitution is
the best that ever was since the creation of the world and it is not possible to make it
better.”3
Today, democracies all around the world experiment with and seek to improve
upon their representative institutions, while the U.S. seems to have taken Braxfield’s
posture: no improvements needed or wanted. Even compared to the other long-
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established democracies sharing English institutions and traditions, the U.S. is markedly
resistant to changes in representational form. At their start, all the English-speaking
democracies used first-past-the-post elections in single member districts for their
legislative elections. Australia embraced preference voting for its House in 1919 and a
form of proportional representation (PR) for its Senate 60 years ago; New Zealand
adopted PR for its unicameral House of Representatives in 1996; even Great Britain
created regional parliaments for Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in the 1990s, all
of them using some kind of PR. Looking around the world, most democracies do not
elect legislators from single-member geographic districts at all, and those that still use
them for some legislative seats choose others by different means to ensure fairer
representation of voters’ party preferences.4 But the U.S. still elects members to
Congress by plurality vote from geographic constituencies, the oldest form of democratic
representation involving elections.
Aside from the expanded franchise, the only improvement the U.S. has made on
the pure territorial representation in use in Restoration England is that the Constitution
requires one chamber of Congress to reapportion once every 10 years to adjust
representation in accordance with the principle of one person, one vote. The U.S. Senate,
however, still cleaves to the old method of representing “trees and acres.”5 Unless a new
state is added, the Senate is never reapportioned, no matter how extreme its divergence
from democratic equality. Given that Wyoming’s 509,294 residents and California’s 36
million each receive equal Senate representation while Washington, DC’s 550,521
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inhabitants have none at all, that divergence is extreme enough to put to the pre-reform
House of Commons to shame.
Relative to the rest of the world, the U.S. system of representation seems
decidedly anachronistic. Geographic constituencies hearken back to a time of small,
isolated, rural communities where communication and travel was difficult. It was a
representational system designed for a time in which geographic location spoke to an
individual’s most important political interests. It predates modern cities, political parties,
the welfare state, the national-security state, multi-ethnic democracy, industrial and now
post-industrial society. In a world that grows more interconnected all the time, the U.S.
electoral system continues to puts supreme emphasis on the protection of local interests.
Today nearly all democracies have implicitly acknowledged that political parties are
more important as expressions of voters’ values and interests than their geographic
location and local concerns, and hence have adopted some form of PR.
This essay will briefly examine consequences of geographic representation for
congressional representation and policymaking. The effects examined here by no means
exhaust the importance of the subject for U.S. politics. Among others, this type of
electoral system also affects the number of effective political parties, the level and extent
of party competition, voter turnout, and the style of political campaigns. The system also
fails to register voters’ party preferences in fair proportion to their presence in the
electorate.6 But less attention has been paid to the way the system affects how
representatives see their roles as legislators and how it affects policy outcomes. In
particular, the effects of giving equal representation to all states in the Senate remain not
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widely understood or appreciated.7 Issues raised by the Senate’s composition go far
beyond democratic theory and the principle of “one person, one vote.” Our eighteenthcentury system of representation has many twenty-first century consequences for internal
legislative politics and policy outcomes.

Parochialism
“Since each representative is beholden to a specific geographical area, issues that
are important to a particular neighborhood or region are sure to have a champion.”8 The
U.S. system of representation guarantees that each geographic part of the country will
have a representative. It also ensures that all members see themselves as “attorneys for
their constituencies,” as well as national legislators.
Geographic representation makes parochialism normative for members of
Congress. Legislators in political systems that take greater cognizance of party do not
face the same representational trade-offs as members of Congress. In PR systems,
candidates run as members of a party, and once in office they are representatives of the
party—its interests and ideological commitments. The role of the Member of Congress is
not so clear. Members must find a way to navigate the representational difficulties of
serving as both a national legislator and a local advocate.
In many respects, the U.S. system tilts the balance in favor of the local. Members
who behave as party mavericks tend to perform better electorally than loyal partisans.9
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Studies of legislative decision-making have shown that members of Congress “consider
the constituency interest first.”10 Rank-ordering electoral systems worldwide on the basis
of legislators’ incentives to cultivate their local constituencies, Carey and Shugart
concluded that only one type of electoral system (that used in the Philippines) extant in
the world better rewards localism than the U.S. Congress.11 Members of Congress have
every incentive to give preference to local over national interests when the two conflict.
An economist may be able to simultaneously conclude that free trade is good for the
national economy but that it creates difficult economic dislocations for particular areas.
But rare is the member of Congress who can even acknowledge that local interests might
not be identical to national interests. Members of Congress who believe that the North
American Free Trade Agreement is bad for their constituents’ interests typically maintain
that free trade is bad national policy, as well.

Reconciling the Irreconcilable
The U.S. system attempts to sustain a legal fiction that all members of a
geographic constituency can be represented by a single member. In most cases, of
course, congressional constituencies are not meaningful communities of interest.
Constituents grouped together in most congressional districts have little or nothing in
common. Constituencies can be highly heterogeneous in terms of economic interest,
religion, race, class, ethnicity, urbanization, and economic development. The largest
states are microcosms of the nation. Constituencies may be narrowly divided in terms of
partisanship and ideology. Members attempt to uphold the legal fiction that they
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represent everyone in their constituency by seeking a “lowest common denominator”
form of representation. They emphasize their personal accessibility to constituents and
narrow, highly localized issues.12 They run vacuous campaigns focusing solely on their
personal qualities and never mentioning their party affiliation or issue positions.
Some members find themselves representing states or districts that are tilted
against them in terms of ideology and partisanship. Such members have no secure
coalition of political support. Members facing this difficult political challenge may
attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable by avoiding national issues as much as possible.
They champion legislation that caters to local concerns. They concentrate on casework,
office hours, pork barrel projects. A number of studies have shown that electorally
vulnerable members secure more federal projects for local constituents.13 Sen. Mary
Landrieu, a Democratic senator representing a state that voted for President Bush’s
reelection by a nine-percentage point margin, narrowly won in 2004 with a slogan, “We
need a senator who will put Louisiana first.” The nature of their geographic constituency
often renders such members only able to effectively fulfill the role of attorney for the
constituency. By contrast, members of legislatures in PR systems are not saddled with
politically debilitating, hostile constituencies. Their constituencies are their supporters.
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Side payments
Geographic representation means that members always have at least two bases for
decision making on national policy: “What is best for the nation?” and “What is in it for
my constituency?” When Congress adopts national policies, it should ideally do so on
the basis of what at least a majority of members believe is in the national interest. But
geographic representation creates a systematic reason for legislators to decide questions
of national policy for reasons that are irrelevant to national interests.
Coalition leaders frequently exploit this second criterion for decision making to
build majorities. By targeting special benefits for members’ constituencies, they can
induce members to vote for policies that they are reluctant to support on their merits.14 In
the summer of 2006, for example, the Republican Senate leadership sought to secure
support for a broad tax reduction package by specifically including extra write-offs for
timber extraction in order to win the votes of three timber-state lawmakers, including
Senators Mark Pryor (D-Ark.), Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.) and Patty Murray (DWash.).15 Whenever important legislation is hard-fought, media reports of similar deals
appear. The outcomes of national policy can thus be decided whenever a pivotal number
of members are willing to exchange their political support in order to secure side
payments for their constituencies.
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Distributive Outcomes
The geographic basis of representation makes members of Congress exquisitely
sensitive to the local effects of policies. Members are highly alert to their parochial
stakes when considering policies that distribute federal dollars geographically. Because
every member of Congress has an equal vote, they tend to see a “fair distribution” of
federal dollars as something approximating equal distribution across constituencies. In
both chambers, Congress has shown itself unable to target funding in programs to areas
of greatest need. The tendency in both chambers is to spread benefits widely across
states and districts, diluting program effectiveness whenever targeting is needed. The
problem is most evident in programs supporting infrastructure (transportation, water and
sewer grants) and regional economic development (enterprise zones, model cities).16
Because of its basis of representation, in the House “fairness” usually means a
distribution that tracks population. For senators, however, “fairness” tends towards
equality across states. The Senate’s basis of representation, however, creates unique and
serious problems. For purposes of policymaking, state population is not just one of many
important state characteristics, such as “area,” “climate,” or “economic development.”
Instead, state population is, generally speaking, the single best predictor of a state’s
funding needs. States with more people need more money for school lunches, job
training, water treatment, transportation, and so on. States at high risk of terrorist attack
areas are highly populated ones. The basis of House representation—and its associated
definition of “fairness”—thus presents fewer problems for policy design.
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Within the confines of the Senate, a senator is only one vote, no matter how many
constituents she represents. The logic of Senate coalition-building thus dictates the
pursuit of the “cheap” votes of small-state senators.17 When senators write formulas to
distribute federal funds they find that a one dollar per capita cut from California’s share
($36 million) will go a long way toward increasing the funding to many small states. In
the process, a coalition builder loses California’s two senators’ votes but gains those of a
greater number of small-state senators. Senator James Inhofe (R-Okla.), chair of the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, described the typical approach
during a 2004 floor debate on the transportation bill: We “pacify some sixty [senators]
by giving them whatever they want in the percentage of the overall, and as to the rest,
who cares: we have our 60 votes and we run.” The “rest” usually includes most of the
senators from the most populous states, who represent most Americans.
In short, when funding needs track population, the Senate typically distributes
funds on a basis other than need. The result: close to 40% of Homeland Security grant
dollars under existing formulas are distributed equally across states. Equally, in other
words, between South Dakota and California, between Vermont and New York.
With population increasingly skewed across the states, Senate representation
significantly distorts policy design. Despite conventional wisdom to the contrary, the
House of Representatives does not offset the Senate small-state bias. The House provides
no representational bonus for large states. Even when the House and Senate compromise
on spending, the outcome tilts toward small states. A small-state bias can thus be found
in most intergovernmental grant programs. When the Senate allocates federal dollars,
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whether for transportation, community development, environmental quality, disaster
assistance, or infrastructure, small-population states typically win and large-population
states lose. The bias is most evident in the programs over which Congress retains
greatest control.18

Dim Prospects for Reform
The Constitution undoubtedly presents a formidable obstacle to political reform.19
But the paralysis of representational reform in the U.S. is only partly a consequence of
the great difficulty of amending the U.S. Constitution. With respect to the House of
Representatives, the Constitution does not require the use of plurality elections in singlemember geographic districts. Instead, Article I, Section 2 merely specifies how the
number of representatives will be apportioned among the states and that eligible voters to
fill those seats will be the same as those for “the most numerous branch of the State
legislature.” Under the Times, Places, and Manner Clause,20 Congress could adopt a
different method or permit states to experiment with alternatives. Indeed, Congress first
required the use of single-member districts in 184221 as a reform measure to stop,
“general-ticket representation,” an anti-democratic practice that many states had used “to
negate political opportunities for minority parties that had sufficient power to be
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competitive in single-member districts by allowing a majority party to win most, if not
all, seats through a statewide election.”22
Reform of Senate representation, however, is an entirely different matter. Article
V exempts Senate representation even from the normal, extremely arduous amendment
process, stating that “no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage
in the Senate,” apparently requiring complete unanimity to reform Senate representation.
This may be one section of the U.S. Constitution that is, literally, unamendable.
America’s rigid adherence to geographic representation probably stems from
sources beyond the institutional barriers to change. There is a notable lack of any
ferment for constitutional reform among elites in the contemporary era. The narrow
divisions of party control in the Congress and in presidential elections may have
encouraged a risk-aversion among both parties. That only a small increment of support
stands between either party and power may have encouraged the leaders of both to think
incrementally and to eschew larger agendas or sweeping political reforms. But the
American public itself unquestionably has a long-standing and well-established
conservatism about U.S. institutions of government. At all levels, Americans still
conceptualize representation in geographic terms. And despite their dissatisfaction with
the operation of politics and political institutions, overwhelming majorities of Americans
persist in believing that the U.S. constitutional system is the best in the world.23
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